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Transplanting Legal Models across
Culturally Diverse Societies:
A Comparative Law Perspective
George MOUSOURAKIS*
Abstract
The changes in the legal universe that have been taking place in the last few
decades have increased the potential value of different kinds of comparative law
information and thereby urged new objectives for the comparative law community.
The comparative method, which was earlier applied in the traditional framework of
domestic law, is now being adapted to the new needs created by the ongoing
globalization process, becoming broader and more comprehensive with respect to
both its scope and goals. Associated with this development is a growing interest in
the question of transferability or transplantability of legal norms and institutions
across different cultures, especially in so far as current legal integration and
harmonization processes require reasonably transferable models. This paper
critically examines the issue of transferability of laws with particular attention to
the theory of legal transplants propounded by Professor Alan Watson, one of the
most influential contemporary comparatists and legal historians. It is submitted that
the element of relativity imposed by the special relationship of the law to its socio-
cultural environment must be taken into consideration when the comparative
method is applied. However, the view held by some scholars that legal transplants
are impossible betrays an exaggeration of cultural diversity as it contradicts the
teachings of history and is at odds with recent trends towards legal integration in
certain world regions.
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Introductory
At a time when our world society is increasingly mobile and legal life is
internationalized, the role of comparative law is gaining importance. While the
growing interest in foreign legal systems may well be attributed to the dramatic
increase in international transactions, this empirical parameter to the growth of
comparative legal studies accounts for only part of the explanation. The other part,
at least equally important, is the expectation of obtaining a deeper understanding of
one’s own legal system through the study and comparison of legal norms,
institutions and principles found in foreign systems. Besides providing the jurist
with a much broader knowledge of the possible range of solutions to legal problems
than the study of a single legal order would present, comparative law gives the
jurist an opportunity to fathom the interaction of different disciplines and to connect
these to the development and operation of legal rules, for example, when one
considers the interface between law and history. Historical analyses of law utilizing
the comparative method are essential for the further development of law today.
Without the knowledge derived from historical-comparative studies it is impossible
to investigate contemporary legal institutions, as these are to a considerable extent
the product of historical conditions and mutual influences of legal systems in the
past. Moreover, comparative legal studies have performed valuable services in
empirically testing the propositions of legal theory.1) These propositions can be
tested on the grounds of concrete comparative material, for there exists a dialectical
relationship between theory and practice that extends beyond the narrow limits of a
single legal culture – indeed, most legal theorists seem to assume a deductive
universality of analysis. As Paton pointed out, it is impossible to comprehend
jurisprudence without comparative law, since all schools of jurisprudence (whether
historical, philosophical, sociological or analytical) rely on the comparative
method.2)
One type of interest pertaining to knowledge and explanation in comparative
law is associated with the traditional comparison de lege lata and/or de lege
ferenda. Pursuant to this comparison are searches for models (both conceptual and
substantial) for the interpretation of current law, or for the formulation and
implementation of legal policy. In today’s complex society the lawmaker is often
faced with difficult problems. Instead of guessing possible solutions and risking
less appropriate results, a lawmaker can draw on the enormous wealth of legal
experience by the study of foreign laws. As Rudolf Jhering once remarked, “[T]he
reception of a foreign legal institution is not a matter of nationality, but a matter of
usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when one has one as
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good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse a good medicine just because it
did not grow in his own back garden.”3) It is thus not surprising that legislators,
when considering different possible approaches to resolving a particular problem,
often take into account how the same (or a similar) problem is dealt with in other
jurisdictions. Indeed, contemporary law-making and law-reform in many countries
is characterized by a sort of eclecticism. This takes the form of using comparative
law to investigate legal approaches and solutions to socio-economic problems, even
if the countries whose laws are studied do not belong to the same broader legal
family as that of the country concerned. Of course, whenever a proposal is put
forward to adopt a foreign legal rule, a legislator must first consider whether the
rule has proved efficient in its country of origin when dealing with the specific
problem at hand and then, second, whether it will produce the desired effects in the
country contemplating its adoption. In many cases it may prove impossible to
adopt, without important modifications, a rule that was successful in a foreign
country because of differences pertaining, for example, to the court system and the
legal process, as well as the more general differences regarding the socio-economic,
political and cultural environment in which the rule would have to fit.
Another type of interest in comparative law is connected with the goal of legal
unification, or at least harmonization and cooperation, at a transnational or
international level.4) An important aspect to the idea of legal unification relates to
the development of supra-national organizations, or the aim of diminishing the
traditional relations between state power and the legal regulation of society.
Projects aimed at the unification or harmonization of laws are designed to reduce or
eradicate, as far as possible and desirable, the discrepancies and inconsistencies
between national legal systems by inducing them to adopt common legal rules and
practices. In pursuance of this objective, uniform rules are often drawn up on the
basis of work by experts in comparative law that are then incorporated in
transnational or international treaties obliging the parties, as a matter of
international law, to adopt the uniform rules as part of their domestic law. Despite
the difficulties arising in connection with unification or harmonization efforts, there
have been some notable successes, especially within countries that closely
cooperate with each other, such as the member countries of the European Union,
and within certain areas of law, such as international commercial law,
transportation law, intellectual property law and the law of negotiable instruments.
The current interest in matters concerning legal unification and harmonization is
connected with the phenomenon of globalization – a phenomenon precipitated by
the rapid rise of transnational law, the growing interdependence of national legal
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systems and the emergence of a large-scale transnational legal practice.
Globalization intensifies the need for a revival of general jurisprudence and a
rethinking of comparative law from a global perspective. Rethinking comparative
law will involve all of the main tasks of legal theory including synthesis, the
construction and elucidation of concepts, the development of theories, both
empirical and normative, and the critical analysis of assumptions and
presuppositions underpinning legal discourse. Legal scholars pursuing this agenda
will often benefit from the learning methods, strategies and techniques of other
disciplines. Political science, economics, sociology, history and anthropology, for
example, are each likely to provide insights that will assist the study of how
institutions and communities influence the development of legal rules. In particular,
there is room for a great deal of work on the question of transferability of legal
models across different cultures, especially in so far as legal integration and
harmonization require reasonably transferable models. In this respect, the need for
understanding cultural diversity in a world driven by trends toward global law
becomes increasingly important. The point here is that law is more than simply a
body of rules or institutions; it is also a social practice within a legal community. It
is this social practice that shapes the actual meaning of the rules and institutions,
their relative weight, and the way they are implemented and operate in society. But
law is not an isolated social practice; it is an aspect of the broader culture to which
it belongs. Understanding law presupposes knowledge of the social practice of the
legal community and this, in turn, implies familiarity with the general culture of the
society in which the legal community is a part.5) The relationship between law and
culture is characterized by continual interaction and interdependence. One might
say that law is an element of the culture of a society that both impacts upon culture
and is permeated by it.6) The legal systems and respective cultures of the world do
not exist in isolation from one another, but often contribute to one another through
the exchange of information, ideas and models. The more intense and pervasive
forms of communication today have engendered more permeable boundaries of the
legal systems than at any time in the past.
Legal Transplants and Reception of Laws
Comparative legal scholarship has an extensive tradition of categorizing systems
of law into transnational legal traditions or families of kinship and descent. The
division of legal systems into transnational traditions or families fosters the
comparative study of law as it allows one to examine legal systems from the
viewpoint of their general characteristics, style or orientation. Apart from its
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practical importance, the division of legal systems into broader families has great
value to legal theory, as it requires a more spherical or comprehensive knowledge
of law as a general social phenomenon. The problem of classifying legal systems
into families has been the subject of discussion among scholars from as early as the
beginning of the twentieth century. Although the proposed classifications were
revised in light of developments in Russia and other Eastern European countries in
recent years, the traditional conceptual framework of legal families remains
relevant for describing legal reality in the world today. According to a theory of
classification proposed by Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff,7) there exist in the world
certain ‘model’ or ‘core’ systems whose legal rules and institutional structures were
directly transplanted (often through military conquest or colonization) or adopted
(by virtue of their perceived quality and prestige) in many countries around the
world. For these authors, the crucial criterion for the classification of legal systems
is the substantive content of laws; and this requires attention to originality,
derivation, and common elements, rather than to external factors, such as race or
geography.8) Another well-known theory of classification has been advanced by
Zweigert. Zweigert’s proposed criterion for the grouping of legal systems into
families is ‘style’ (Rechtsstil), a multi-faceted or multi-dimensional criterion shaped
by the interaction of the following factors: a) the historical background and
development of a particular system; b) its predominant and characteristic mode of
legal thinking; c) its distinctive legal institutions; d) the hierarchy and interpretation
of its legal sources; and e) the ideological background of the system.9) It should be
mentioned, however, that the borderlines between the various legal families
identified by comparatist scholars are not always clear, and thus it is sometimes
difficult to identify with certainty which family a legal system belongs to. Special
difficulties are presented by the classification of the so-called ‘mixed’ or ‘hybrid’
legal systems, that is, systems whose development has been influenced by two or
more legal families.10) Moreover, the legal systems of many countries in Asia and
Africa constitute a mixture of traditional local law, religious elements and the law
imported from European countries during the colonial period or in more recent
times.11)
A great deal of the similarities that exist among legal systems belonging to the
same broader legal family or transnational tradition are the result of ‘legal
borrowing’ or ‘legal transplanting’. ‘Legal transplanting’ involves a legal system
incorporating a legal rule, institution or doctrine adopted from another legal system.
It may also pertain to the reception of an entire legal system, which may occur in a
centralist way. To understand the reception of foreign law phenomenon one must
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examine the historical reasons behind the introduction of foreign law in a particular
case, e.g. whether it is the result of conquest, colonial expansion or the political
influence of the state whose law is adopted. Territorial expansion through military
conquest did not always entail the imposition of the conquering peoples’ laws on
the subjugated populations. For example, in lands under Roman, Germanic and
Islamic rule subject populations continued to be governed by their own systems of
law under the so-called ‘principle of the personality of law’. In some cases a direct
imposition did in fact occur, as happened, for instance, with the introduction of
Spanish law in South America. In other cases the law of the conquering nation was
introduced in part or in an indirect fashion. For example, during the British and
French colonial expansion there was a tendency to introduce into the colonies
elements of the legal systems of the colonial powers or to develop systems of law
adapted to local circumstances but largely reflecting the character of the
metropolitan systems. Furthermore, one should recognize that the process of legal
transplanting might be interrupted, or precipitated, by revolutionary change. A
revolution may be defined as an historical event that may change the identity of a
socio-political system by altering the ideological foundations of its legitimacy and,
consequently, its orientation. A revolutionary legitimacy change is the most radical
change that a socio-political system may undergo.12) The transformation of a
country’s legal system prompted by such a change may entail the system of law
moving further away from or closer to other systems, so far as ideological
differences and similarities with respect to different countries’ socio-political and
economic structure are expressed in law.13)
As commentators have observed, the perceived quality and prestige of the donor
system plays a central part in a legal reception process. Consider, for instance, the
reception of Roman law in Europe and its admirable longevity as a system under
different socio-economic conditions. Roman law, as preserved by the compilers of
Justinian’s codification in the sixth century AD, was one of the strongest formative
forces in the development of Western legal culture. It was adopted and applied in
most of continental Europe during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (in wide
areas of Germany and other European regions it remained an immediate source of
law until the end of the nineteenth century). Roman law was received in Catholic,
Calvinist and Lutheran countries; it operated in countries where agriculture
dominated economic life and it also applied in mercantile centres and later in
countries undergoing the industrialization process. This system of law, first adopted
in Europe, was directly or indirectly (through a European law code) transplanted in
South America, Quebec, Louisiana and many countries in Asia and Africa. But why
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was Roman law adopted? The medieval reception of Roman law was partly due to
the lack of centralized governments and developed formal legal systems that could
compete with the comprehensive inheritance of Rome; and partly due to the fact
that the lands formerly governed by the Romans were accustomed to this style of
thought, and accorded it wisdom and authority. A third feature, deriving almost
completely from the model of the Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis, was the desire of the
emerging nation-states to codify their laws and the aspirations of later jurists to
conform their studies to this model. The important point here is that Roman law
was not adopted merely because it was admired, nor because its norms were
particularly suitable for the social conditions in the early European nation-states. In
fact, many norms of Roman law were entirely antiquated. Foremost, it was the
perceived superiority of Roman law as a system that led to the adoption of its
norms, even if this adoption was supported by a learned tradition that endured for
centuries.14) Thus, as an important common denominator of Western legal
experience, the conceptual system of Roman law may be said to be an apt tertium
comparationis – a common basis of the legally organized relationships of life.15)
Nowadays, foreign rules or doctrines are usually ‘borrowed’ in the context of
legal practice itself because they fill a gap or meet a particular need in the
importing country. As already noted, one of the chief objectives of comparative law
has traditionally been the systematic study of foreign laws with the view to deriving
models that would assist the formulation and implementation of the legislative
policies of states. In drafting or revising statutes and law codes, national legislators
often rely on large-scale legislative comparisons that they themselves undertake or
mandate. A legislator’s readiness to adopt a foreign legal rule is often associated
with considerations of economic efficiency. According to Mattei, the reception of
foreign legal rules is usually the end result of a competition where each legal
system provides different rules for the resolution of a specific problem.16) In a
market of a legal culture, where rule suppliers are concerned with satisfying
demand, ultimately the most efficient rule will be the winner.17) Moreover, the
study of foreign laws can also be valuable when courts and other authorities
interpret and apply the legal rules of their own legal system. In so far as a judge, in
filling a gap in the law, is expected to decide in the way in which the legislator
would have decided, then the question is: how does a modern legislator reach their
decisions? As already noted, a legislator often reaches their decisions by taking into
account information about foreign systems provided by comparatists. It is thus
unsurprising that judges often seek to justify their decisions by pointing to the fact
that a similar approach has been adopted in other jurisdictions. This is especially
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true when a judge interprets and applies rules that have been borrowed from other
legal systems, as well as the rules introduced as a result of international unification
or harmonization of law. As the above discussion suggests, a study of legal
borrowing must also address the roles that the legal profession, legal science and
legal education play in the reception process; the form of the imported law (whether
it is a written, customary or judge-made); and whether (or to what extent) the
importing and exporting countries are compatible with respect to culture, socio-
political structure and level of economic development.
The destinies of legal transplants in diverse cultural, socio-economic and
political contexts are important to examine for determining the desirability and
applicability of such transplants for legislative and judicial practice. It may be true
that ethno-cultural, political and socio-economic differences between the exporting
and the importing countries do not necessarily preclude the successful
transplantation of legal rules and institutions. Legal rules can be taken out of
context and can serve as a model for legal development in a very different society.
However, one should keep in mind that an imported legal norm is occasionally
ascribed a different, local meaning, when it is rapidly indigenized on account of the
host culture’s inherent integrative capacity. It is not surprising that, very often,
Western legal concepts, institutions and rules imported by non-Western countries
are understood in a way that is different from that in the donor countries. The
absence of substantial differences in the wording of a statute law between a donor
and a host country does not imply that legal reality, or everyday legal and social
practice in the two countries, should be identical or similar. The legal reality in the
host country may be very different with respect to the way people (including judges
and state officials) read, interpret and justify the relevant law and the court
decisions based on it. Moreover, the role of statute law in the recipient country may
be much weaker than it is in the exporting country and custom may be a
predominant factor. Thus, in practice, social rules might effectively prevent people
from initiating a legal claim or even using a court decision supporting such a claim.
As this suggests, it is not good sense to use the perspective and framework of one’s
own legal culture when examining a legal rule or institution borrowed by a legal
system operating within the context of another culture.18) Such an approach carries
the risk of implying the existence of many more similarities than there actually
are.19)
Legal Transplants and Legal Development: Watson’s Theory Revisited
Since the publication of the first edition of his seminal book, Legal Transplants:
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An Approach to Comparative Law in 1974, Professor Alan Watson has produced
many works on the relationship between law and society, and the factors accounting
for legal change.20) In these works he iterates his belief that changes in a legal
system are due to legal transplants: the transfer of legal rules and institutions from
one legal system to another. According to Watson, the nomadic character or rules
proves that the idea of a close relationship between law and society is a fallacy.21)
Law is largely autonomous and develops by transplantation, not because some rule
was the inevitable consequence of the social structure, but because those who
control law-making were aware of the foreign rule and recognised the apparent
benefits that could derive from it.22) Watson does not contemplate that rules are
borrowed without alteration or modification; rather, he indicates that voluntary
transplants would nearly always – always in the case of a major transplant – involve
a change in the law largely unconnected with particular factors operating within
society.23) Neither does Watson expect that a rule, once transplanted, will operate in
exactly the same way it did in the country of its origin. Against this background,
Watson argues that comparative law, construed as a distinct intellectual discipline,
should be concerned with the study of the historical relationships between legal
orders and the destinies of legal transplants in different countries.24) On this basis
one may identify the factors explaining the change or immutability of law.25)
Watson asserts that comparative law (which he distinguishes from a knowledge of
foreign law) can enable those engaged in law reform to better understand their
historical role and tasks. It can provide them with a clearer perspective as to
whether and to what extent it is reasonable to appropriate from other systems and
which systems to select; and whether it is possible to accept foreign legal rules and
institutions with or without modifications.26)
The concept of transplant bias is an essential element of Watson’s theory that
legal change primarily occurs through the appropriation or imitation of norms. It
refers to a system’s receptivity to a particular foreign law as a matter distinct from
acceptance based on a thorough assessment of all possible alternatives.27) This
receptivity varies from system to system and its extent depends on factors such as
the linguistic tradition shared with a potential donor system; the general prestige of
the possible donor system; and the educational background and experience of the
legal professionals in the recipient system. The adoption of an entire foreign legal
code is probably the clearest manifestation of transplant bias. According to Watson,
juristic doctrine is particularly susceptible to foreign influence.28) Precedent, on the
other hand, seems to be least affected by transplant bias – when judges borrow from
foreign legal systems, the value of the foreign rule for the judge’s own system is
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often carefully considered and evaluated. Transplant bias involves an authoritative
argument that takes, for example, the form: norm N is a Roman law norm – Roman
law is superior – therefore, norm N should be accepted. Behind the minor premise
of this inference there is no general appraisal of all norms of Roman law, but rather
an opinion based upon the systematical coherence of the relevant norm. The
assertion, ‘Roman law is superior’, is neither deductive (i.e. based upon an axiom
concerning the superiority of Roman law) nor inductive (where one should present
reasons for considering the particular norm N good); rather it is quasi-inductive and
systematical.
The experience of the legal historian underlies Watson’s scepticism towards the
view that law is directly derived from social conditions. According to him, history
shows that legal change in European private law has occurred mainly by
transplantation of legal rules and is not necessarily due to the impact of social
structures. He sees legal change as an essentially ‘internal’ process,29) in the sense
that sociological influences on legal development are considered generally
unimportant. The evidence to support this position is derived from history, which
Watson claims to show: that the transplanting of legal rules between systems is
socially easy even when there are great material and cultural differences between
the donor and recipient societies; that no area of private law is very resistant to
change through foreign influence – contrary to the sociologically oriented argument
that culturally rooted law is more difficult to change than merely instrumental
law;30) and that the recipient legal systems require no knowledge of the context of
origin and development of the laws received by transplantation from another
system.31) Social, economic, and political factors affect the shape of the generated
law only to the extent they are present in the consciousness of lawmakers, i.e. the
group of lawyers and jurists who control the mechanisms of legal change. The
lawmakers’ awareness of these factors may be heightened by pressure from other
parts of society, but even then, the lawmakers’ response will be conditioned by the
legal tradition: by their learning, expertise and knowledge of law, domestic and
foreign. Societal pressure may engender a change in the law, but the resulting legal
rule will usually be adopted from a system known to the lawmaker and often
modified without always a full consideration of the local conditions. Watson
stresses that law is, to a large extent, a phenomenon operating at the level of
ideology; it is an autonomous discipline largely resistant to influences beyond the
law itself. From this point of view, he argues that the law itself provides the
impetus for change.32) At the same time, he recognizes that there is a necessary
relationship between law and society, notwithstanding that a considerable
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disharmony tends to exist between the best rule that the society envisages for itself
and the rule that it actually has. The task of legal theory with comparative law as
the starting-point is to shed light on this relationship and, in particular, to elucidate
the inconsistencies between the law actually in force and the ideal law, i.e. the law
that would correspond to the demands of society or its dominant strata.33)
Watson’s work on the concepts of legal transplants and legal change calls into
question the notion that law is a local phenomenon functionally connected with the
living conditions of a particular society. His statement that “legal rules are not
peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they now operate”34) is
descriptive rather than normative in nature. It implies that the reception of foreign
legal norms and institutions often occurs without the benefit of full familiarity with
whatever is adopted in the receiving country. And even when the borrowed rule
remains unaltered, its impact in the new socio-cultural setting may be entirely
different.35) For Watson, the source of the original legal norm or institution does not
control the final result of the process of transplantation or borrowing. It is the
recipient and not the donor system that has the last word on the mode of application
of the imported law. However, as critics have pointed out, Watson’s position
involves a paradox: if the recipient system controls the outcome of the process
initiated by the transplanting, how can one say that foreign models are actually at
work in the new local context?36) According to Legrand, ‘legal transplants’ cannot
happen, for no rule in the borrowing jurisdiction can have any significance as
regards the rule in the jurisdiction from which it is borrowed. This is because, as it
crosses borders, the original rule undergoes a change that affects it qua rule. Thus,
any approach attributing change in law to the displacement of rules across borders
is ill-founded, for it fails to treat rules as actively constituted through the life of
interpretive communities. Furthermore, it fails to make apparent the fact that rules
are the product of divergent and conflicting interests in society, that is, it eliminates
the dimension of power from the equation. In light of the above, Legrand concludes
that the shifting complexity of development in the law cannot be adequately
explained through a rigid framework such as that furnished by the legal transplants
thesis.37)
In my view, the objections of those critics emphasizing cultural diversity do not
militate against the validity of Watson’s theory. It may be true that each legal
culture is the product of a unique combination of socio-cultural and historical
factors. Nevertheless, it is equally true that collective cultural identities are formed
through interaction with others and no culture can claim to be entirely original.38)
There is a degree of uniformity with respect to the emergence of certain needs as
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societies progress through similar stages of development and a natural tendency
exists towards imitation, which may be precipitated by a desire to accelerate
progress or pursue common political and socio-economic objectives.39) According
to del Vecchio, “the basic unity of human spirit makes possible the effective
communication between peoples. Law is not only a national phenomenon; it is, first
and foremost, a human phenomenon. A people can accept and adopt as its own a
law created by another people because, in the nature of both peoples, there exist
common demands and needs which [often] find expression in law”.40) The German
comparatist Konrad Zweigert, cites many examples from various legal systems, to
argue that in ‘unpolitical’ areas of private law, such as commercial and property
transactions and business dealings, the similarities in the substantive contents of
legal rules and the practical solutions to which they lead are so significant that one
may speak of a ‘presumption of similarity’ (praesumptio similitudinis).41) This
presumption, he claims, can serve as a useful tool in the comparative study of
different legal systems. Despite the sheer diversity of cultural traditions in the
world today, the problems dogging the regional harmonization of law (e.g., at a
European level) and the difficulties surrounding the prospect of convergence of the
common and civil law systems, quite a few comparatists today still espouse a
universalist approach either through their description of laws or by looking for
ways in which legal unification or harmonization at an international or transnational
level may be achieved. It is submitted that if it is true that legal rules emanate as a
response to social needs (according to the socio-functional view of law), the
emergence of a global society will almost inevitably lead to a degree of
convergence between different legal systems.42)
Watson’s theory of legal transplants has been subjected to strong criticism by
scholars who insist on functional-sociological explanations of law.43) However,
much of this criticism fails to detect the intellectual roots of Watson’s theory and
misses the opportunity to evaluate it in the light of its proper background. As
already noted, Watson remarks that, as a matter of fact, societies often tolerate
much law that has no correspondence with what is ‘needed’ or regarded as efficient.
The thesis that law may be dysfunctional in relation to society lies in the idea of
‘survivals’ – a key concept of nineteenth and early twentieth century evolutionary
anthropology. In his 1871 work on Primitive Culture, E. B. Tylor (often called ‘the
father of British anthropology”), formulated a comprehensive theory to bridge the
gap between the present and the remote past. This was the theory of ‘survivals’:
elements of culture or society that evolution has left behind – irrational, obsolete
practices and beliefs that continue past their period of usefulness. Tylor’s influential
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treatment of survivals inspired Oliver Wendell Holmes’s analysis of the
permanence of legal norms and institutions after the demise of the beliefs,
necessities or customs that generated them.44) From a functional viewpoint,
however, survivals cannot be adequately understood simply by reference to that
mental disposition called ‘conservativism’. Conservartism itself is in need of
explaining and that explanation has to be functional.45) Watson’s notion of ‘inertia’
may be useful to consider in this connection. Inertia is defined as the general
absence of a sustained interest of society and its ruling elite to struggle for the most
socially satisfactory rule. For law to be changed there must exist a sufficiently
strong impulse directed through a pressure force operating on a source of law. This
impulse must be strong enough to overcome the inertia. But how can inertia be
explained? Watson notes that there is a normal desire for stability and society,
particularly the dominant elite, have a generalized interest in maintaining the status
quo. This reflects an abstract interest in stability, which is linked to the fact that
many legal norms have no direct impact on the lives of most citizens. Furthermore,
the mystique surrounding law as well as practical considerations may obstruct legal
change. For instance, the case may be that anticipated long-term benefits are not
sufficient to justify a reform if the costs are not outweighed by the short-term
benefits. Legal inertia has, I think, two aspects. First, it renders a ‘static’
justification of law sufficient: law is justified by past behaviour and behaviour by
norms. This kind of inertia is inherent in all legal decision-making that strives to
maintain regularity and predictability in the practice of law. Besides this aspect of
inertia, inertia also relates to the structure and function of law in society. There are
two kinds of structural matters for consideration: (a) law is to a certain extent
resistant to certain social change, and society to certain legal change; and (b) there
is a ‘relative resistance’ to change pertaining to the time-lag between different
functionally interdependent changes.
We may now proceed to comment on Watson’s attempt to explain why the legal
rules are quite often borrowed rather than generated by a given society. As
previously noted, for Watson much in the law depends upon its ‘internal logic’ – a
logic that is very much that of an elite distancing itself from the rest of society. In
the creation of their product, lawyers enjoy a great deal of freedom and legal
transplants occur thanks to that freedom. According to Watson, in most areas of
law, and in particular within private law, it is not the holders of political power
(those who prescribe which persons or bodies create the law and how the validity of
the law is assessed) who determine what the relevant rules are or should be.46) The
study of the activity of the jurisconsults in ancient Rome, of the law professors in
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Continental Europe and of the English judges clearly demonstrates the importance
of legal elites as the real shapers of the law. In Watson’s scheme, the discourses of
legal elites are largely self-referential: the members of a professional group, such as
lawyers, regard the law as belonging to their (distinct) professional culture. Within
this group, authority is derived primarily from reputation. And reputation, in turn,
depends on argumentative skill and inventiveness according to the rules of legal
reasoning governing legal debates – rules that have implicitly been established by
the participants themselves. This is why lawyers claim to be solving legal problems
by applying a legal logic peculiar to their own profession. Thus, although lawyers
may be involved directly or indirectly in political decisions, their intellectual
outlook does not necessarily depend on their political orientation. Many critics
failed to grasp the functional character of Watson’s explanation as to why lawyers
devote so much energy playing self-referential games. His point is that lawyers’
activities that apparently do not satisfy any practical need establish and confirm
their identity as an elite. The outcome of lawyers’ discussions may be arbitrary or
may reflect specific power pressures or demands. But even when the result of the
process is arbitrary, it can still be explained functionally.
Concluding Remarks
The starting-point of comparative law is often the appearance of common social
problems in different legal orders. The question is whether there are common
features or, conversely, differences in their legal regulation within these diverse
legal orders. How should these similarities or differences be explained? But the
existence of a common social problem is not a sufficient starting-point for
comparative law. For a meaningful legal comparison to be undertaken some
common features of culture are essential. The element of relativity must be
considered when comparative law is used in the search for similarities between
different legal systems or relied upon to enhance the understanding of one’s own
legal system, or employed in the process of harmonizing law. This relativity is
imposed by the special relationship of the law to its cultural, political and socio-
economic environment and its effect on the meaning and function of legal rules,
institutions and principles must be addressed. To the extent that socio-cultural
diversity is a reality, law is bound to be defined in diversified terms. However, the
view that legal transplants are impossible, as some scholars have asserted, is too
extreme and betrays an exaggeration of cultural diversity. To deny the possibility or
the desirability of legal transplants contradicts the teachings of history and is at
odds with the need for legal integration in certain world regions. What is required is
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a form of analysis that would be capable of striking the right balance between these,
seemingly contradictory, perspectives.
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